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101 
PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH* 
INTRODUCTION 
While scholars routinely question the normative significance of the 
distinction between public law and private law, few—if any—question its 
conceptual basis. Put in simple terms, private law refers to bodies of legal 
doctrine that govern the horizontal interaction between actors, be they 
individuals, corporate entities, or on occasion the state acting in its private 
capacity.1 Public law on the other hand refers to doctrinal areas that deal with 
vertical interaction between the state and non-state actors, wherein the state 
exerts a direct and overbearing influence on the shape and course of the law.2 
The latter is epitomized by the areas of constitutional law, administrative 
law, and criminal law, while the areas of contract law, tort law, property law, 
and the law of unjust enrichment exemplify the former. 
Underlying this basic distinction is an important institutional 
dimension. Most areas that are treated as exemplifying private law are areas 
of the common law, meaning that they are judge-made in origin. Common 
law rules continue to be policed and developed by courts incrementally, from 
within the context of individual disputes.3 Consequently, private law and the 
common law are routinely treated as synonymous and analytically 
coterminous with each other. While this characterization may have had few 
 
 *.  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Yun-chien Chang 
and Richard Epstein for organizing the symposium on “Convergence and Divergence in Private Law” at 
NYU.  
 1.  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 
1397 n.2 (2016); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for 
the Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–26 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 
1397 n.2 (2016); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for 
the Twenty First Century: An Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 125, 125–26 (2013). 
 3.  See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4–7 (1988). 
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problems in simpler times, the emergence of the modern administrative state 
has served to render it grossly misleading in important respects. 
Treating private law as subsumed entirely within the common law has 
produced a critical blindspot for private law thinking. It causes discussions 
of private law to overlook the role of the legislature in governing horizontal 
legal interactions.4 In numerous areas, statutory intervention has come to 
supplement and modify common law rules. Indeed, several domains of 
horizontal interaction between private actors are today governed entirely by 
statutory law. While this neglect is for the most part seen in all common law 
countries, in the context of the U.S. it has come to be further entrenched by 
an influential development in post-World War II legal thinking that has given 
it a superficial structural legitimacy. And this is the reality that under the 
influence of the Legal Process school of thinking, the subjects of 
“legislation” and “statutory interpretation” have come to be understood and 
theorized as public law subjects. By prioritizing form over substance and 
thus focusing on the institutional origin of the law rather than on its 
substantive content, this public law approach to legislation today dominates 
American legal thinking in a way that has served to turn private law’s 
legislative blindspot into a serious threat to the very analytical significance 
of private law thinking. 
This Essay is an attempt to describe the basis and consequences of the 
disconnect between private law and legislation, both for private law 
theorizing and legal thinking more generally. It does so by focusing on 
“private law statutes,” legislation (and legislative provisions) that creates or 
modifies rights and obligations between parties in their private capacities. 
Private law statutes do more than merely create private causes of action. 
While they create private cases, they do so on the basis of principles that are 
specific to the horizontal interaction between parties, rather than entirely for 
public-regarding policy reasons. While statutes in the areas traditionally 
identified as private law remain obvious examples, the category extends to 
altogether new domains as well. 
Private law statutes are today well known in the U.K. (and numerous 
 
 4.  For prior efforts to identify this shortcoming, see T.T. Arvind & Jenny Steele, Introduction: 
Legislation and the Shape of Tort Law, in TORT LAW AND THE LEGISLATURE: COMMON LAW, STATUTE 
AND THE DYNAMICS OF LEGAL 1, 1 (T.T. Arvind & Jenny Steele eds., 2012); Kit Barker, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law, in PRIVATE LAW: KEY ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 1, 6 (Kit Barker 
& Darryn Jensen eds. 2013). For what is to date the only discussion of this in the U.S. context, see Jeffrey 
A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1691 (2014). 
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other common law jurisdictions that follow the U.K. model 5 ), where 
statutory interpretation is far from being regarded as a purely public law 
subject. Courts (and increasingly scholars) in these jurisdictions remain 
willing to interpret and understand these statutes using private law principles 
and ideas, without necessarily allowing considerations of form, structure, 
and policy to override substance. This presents an interesting contrast to the 
U.S., where courts and scholars take the public law orientation of a statute 
for granted and search exclusively for public policy considerations in 
interpreting it, despite its content. 6  The contrast—between what is best 
described as private law statutory interpretation and public law statutory 
interpretation—offers helpful lessons for how American legal thinking 
might reorient its approach to statutory interpretation in order to recognize 
the distinctiveness of private law statutes. 
Part I begins with an overview of the dominant approach to legislation 
and statutory interpretation in the U.S., which views the subject as a public 
law area. Part II then introduces the idea of private law statutes and private 
law statutory interpretation. It describes the operation and significance of 
private law statutes in the U.K. and contrasts the approach to interpretation 
that courts adopt in interpreting them with the approach adopted by U.S. 
courts on similar issues. Part III then moves to the prescriptive and offers a 
few tentative suggestions for how U.S. courts might develop an approach to 
interpreting private law statutes and provisions. 
I.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS PUBLIC LAW IN THE U.S. 
While the subjects of “legislation” and “statutory interpretation” had 
been in existence in American legal scholarship since the nineteenth century, 
they remained significantly under-theorized until the middle of the twentieth 
century. 7  To classical legal thinkers (that is, the “Legal Formalists”) 
legislation was at best an imperfect source of law, given its political (and 
therefore unprincipled) overtones.8 And to the Legal Realists who came after 
 
 5.  Examples in this category include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Singapore and other 
members of the Commonwealth, consisting mostly of prior British colonies. See generally Howard W. 
Leichter, The Patterns and Origins of Policy Diffusion: The Case of the Commonwealth, 15 Comp. Pol. 
223, (1983).  
 6.  Pojanowski, supra note 4, at 1692 (“much scholarship on statutory interpretation, a field that 
has also witnessed great theoretical development, considers itself to be operating in the realm of public 
law.”). 
 7.  For a useful account of this revival, see generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the 
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1992) (discussing the 
development of scholarship in legislation).  
 8.  Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 34 (1983); Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth Century in Relation to 
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them, statutory interpretation promoted a variety of post-hoc rationalizations 
that masked the indeterminacy of legal doctrine.9 
All of this changed with the advent of the Legal Process school of 
thinking, developed and advanced by Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks, 
which sought to develop the central insights of the Realists but grounded it 
in a structural theory about law-making and state institutions.10 The Legal 
Process approach is routinely described as one of the most influential 
approaches to “public law” in American history, and as having charted the 
direction of public law thinking for several generations.11 Describing it as a 
“theoretical watershed in [American] statutory interpretation,” Bill Eskridge 
notes how Legal Process thinking advocated looking beyond statutory text 
and legislative history in interpreting legislation.12 Implicit in their theory, 
according to Eskridge, was a recognition that statutory interpretation ought 
to be guided by a “public values analysis”—a set of public law based 
background principles that guide the interpreter.13 Central to the idea of 
public values is the recognition that the law is driven by conceptions of 
justice and the common good, rather than individualist or private 
considerations unique to any individual or group. 14  The Legal Process 
approach to statutory interpretation proved to be enormously influential in 
the American context, post-World War II. 
Critical to Legal Process thinking, especially in its application to 
legislation, was the belief that underlying every statute was an overarching 
collectivist “policy” or common purpose.15 This policy or purpose was worth 
discerning, explicating, and applying during the interpretive process—even 
at the cost of other variables. Speaking of Hart’s own theory of statutory 
 
Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the Absence of It, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. 
REV. 151, 152–53 (1906). 
 9.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950); Jerome Frank, Words and 
Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (1947). 
 10.  See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994) (discussing development of a theory of legal decision-making, particularly with respect to 
public law). 
 11.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1012 (1989). 
 12.  Id. at 1012–13. 
 13.  Id. at 1012. 
 14.  Id. at 1008 (“[p]ublic values appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the 
desires of just one person or group.”). 
 15.  See HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2043 (1994).  
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interpretation, two theorists of Legal Process thus note that he “preferred 
practical, dynamic, policy-oriented applications of statutes over legalistic, 
static, linguistic-oriented or history-oriented interpretations.”16 He also took 
the view that legislative interventions in statutes could form arbitrary starting 
points, such that background principles could be legitimately sacrificed.17 
This last point is particularly important for the analysis here, since it 
suggests a few things of importance about this approach to statutory 
interpretation. It tells us that an overarching “policy,” understood as the 
overall purpose behind the statute, takes precedence over unarticulated 
background principles, which merely represent the means needed to achieve 
the purpose. The distinction between policy and principles is a well-known 
if complicated one, made famous by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin understood 
a policy in terms of the law’s overall goals, which were usually externally 
defined, in contrast to principles, which to him were to be derived from 
within the law and its commitment to justice, fairness, or morality.18 The 
distinction is of some significance to private law theories, wherein principles 
deriving from the horizontal interaction between the parties are seen as just 
as important (if not of greater normative import) than the policy goals at 
hand. 
Fidelity to an identified legislative policy was therefore the overarching 
ideal of the Legal Process approach to interpretation. Quite naturally, this 
also meant ignoring any principles enmeshed in the substantive content of 
the law, when in conflict with such policy. The working of this public law 
approach to interpretation is best captured by the first example that Hart and 
Sacks use to illustrate their theory: “The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes.”19 
While not offered (by them) as an illustration for statutory interpretation, its 
deployment of the statute effectively captures this policy-focused thinking 
within the domain of interpreting and applying legislation. Drawn as it was 
from the context of an actual set of opinions, it also aptly illustrates the 
approach to legislation that had become entrenched by the time of their 
writing. 
In 1930, Congress passed a federal law known as the Perishable 
 
 16.  Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 15, at 2038. 
 17.  William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal 
Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at lxxx (drawing these conclusions from a detailed review of 
Hart’s notes and papers). 
 18.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977); Ronald Dworkin, The Model 
of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967).  
 19.  HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 10. 
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Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA).20 Its principal provision made it 
unlawful for “any dealer to reject or fail to deliver in accordance with the 
terms of the contract without reasonable cause any perishable agricultural 
commodity” that had been entered into interstate commerce.21 Structurally, 
it was therefore a law that was parasitic on (state) contract law and the terms 
of the contract. A depression-era legislation, PACA was enacted to protect 
vendors of perishable commodities against unfair dealings by receivers, who 
had the ability to hold the vendors hostage given the perishable nature of the 
goods at issue.22 As a piece of economic legislation, PACA was therefore 
designed to produce a more efficient and egalitarian marketplace. Yet at the 
same time, it was also a piece of contract law, in that it merely added a federal 
remedy for the breach by simply providing that a violation will result in 
“liab[ility] to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of 
damages . . . sustained in consequence of such violation.”23 
Hart and Sacks use the case L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & 
Co.,24 that employed the PACA to illustrate their theory. The case involved 
a contract for the supply of cantaloupes of a certain quality, sold under the 
terms “[R]olling [A]cceptance [F]inal.” When the vendor supplied them, the 
recipient rejected them claiming that they were not of the specified quality 
since they had been infected with rot, and the dispute that arose was whether 
the rejection was lawful.25 The vendor began the action by filing a complaint 
with the Department of Agriculture, which ruled that the recipient had no 
right of rejection.26 The recipient then took the matter to the federal courts. 
The district court treated the case as a simple contract law dispute and 
applied the traditional principles of the law of sales. On that basis, it 
concluded that the rejection was lawful since a rolling acceptance merely 
required the recipient to accept responsibility for any in-transit damage or 
deterioration. When the goods were not as described in the contract, the 
implied warranties of description and quality were violated, which allowed 
for the rejection.27 
 
 20.  7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s (2017). 
 21.  Id. § 499b(2). 
 22.  For an overview, see J.W. Looney, Protection for Sellers of Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities: Reparation Proceedings and the Statutory Trust Under the Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675 (1990).  
 23.  7 U.S.C. § 499e (a) (2017). 
 24.  169 F.2d 60, 60 (1st Cir. 1948). 
 25.  Joseph Martinelli & Co. v. L. Gillarde Co., 73 F. Supp. 293, 294–95 (D. Mass. 1947). 
 26.  Id. at 294. 
 27.  Martinelli, 73 F. Supp. at 296. 
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On appeal, at first the Court of Appeals reversed the district court—but 
on purely contract law grounds—finding that under the express terms of the 
contract, the recipient’s right to reject had been waived. 28  Instead, it 
concluded that in light of the breach of warranties, the recipient was entitled 
to no more than a claim for damages sustained from the breach.29 After the 
appellate court’s decision however, the respondent filed a petition for 
rehearing, which was supported by the Department of Agriculture in an 
amicus brief. The Department advanced an interpretation of the statute that 
consciously underplayed the role of general contract law. Instead, it argued 
that as a matter of public policy, the court ought to be more aware of how 
rejections of perishable commodities impacted the market for them. In 
specific, it emphasized that the court was to pay attention to the “rejection 
evil,” which “was one of the principal factors which led to the enactment of 
the” PACA.30 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Court of Appeals gave in and reconsidered 
its decision. In its new opinion, it adopted an interpretation of the statute that 
in many ways showcases the Legal Process-driven public law approach. The 
new opinion said nothing of traditional contract law principles as it once had, 
and instead focused on discerning the “intent[ion]” behind the statute, which 
was the court’s term for the overall purpose and policy which had motivated 
its passage.31 The court bought the argument that the rejection “evil” was of 
paramount importance, and accordingly signed on to the Department’s 
interpretation, reversing its own decision on the availability of a damages 
remedy.32 
While Hart and Sacks use the case to illustrate the working of their 
overall theory of institutional settlement in the law, it is also a useful lesson 
in the approach to statutes and legislation that they advance in the course of 
their theory—and which has since come to dominate American thinking 
since. The straightforward private law question of whether a party was 
entitled to seek damages for non-performance even after wrongfully 
rejecting the goods (discounting for the loss occurring from that wrongful 
rejection) was rendered altogether irrelevant by a collectivist policy 
consideration that had to do with the overall regulation of the market. It 
wasn’t that the court sought to balance the parties’ private considerations 
 
 28.  L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 168 F.2d 276, 280–81 (1st Cir. 1948). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at 56–57 (reproducing portions from the brief filed by the 
Department). 
 31.  L. Gillarde Co., 169 F.2d at 61. 
 32.  Id. 
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against broader public ones, but instead that it allowed the latter to eviscerate 
the need for the former altogether. Principles of basic contract law would 
have had the court focus on the parties’ contractual intent and/or whether the 
contractual consideration covered the claim at issue. Yet none of that now 
mattered to the court once the public purpose behind the statute was seen to 
be paramount. 
The case epitomizes the public law approach to statutory interpretation 
that has since taken hold of American legal thinking. The approach makes 
obvious (and perfect) sense when the underlying substance of the legislation 
is collectivist in orientation, such as it is with regulatory enactments. All the 
same, when it involves horizontal interactions—most commonly in the form 
of private causes of action—those interactions are seen as adding nothing of 
normative import at all to the legislation. Instead, they are seen as mere 
means to the overall public end. 
With the elimination of federal general common law by Erie,33 most 
U.S. federal legislation has come to be understood almost exclusively in 
public law terms. The pervasiveness of this approach is best captured by the 
following observations of the Supreme Court in a 1950s decision interpreting 
the provisions of a labor statute: 
Statutes may be called public because the rights conferred are of general 
application, while laws known as private affect few or selected individuals 
or localities. . . . [The] distinction between public and private law is less 
sharp and significant in this country, where one system of law courts 
applies both, than in the Continental practice which administers public law 
through a system of courts separate from that which deals with private law 
questions. . . . Perhaps in this country the most usual differentiation is 
between the legal rights or duties enforced through the administrative 
process and those left to enforcement on private initiative in the law 
courts. . . .  
Federal law has largely developed and expanded as public law in this latter 
sense. It consists of substituting federal statute law applied by 
administrative procedures in the public interest in the place of individual 
suits in courts to enforce common-law doctrines of private right.34 
The Court’s language here is telling and vividly showcases the two core 
points previously made: (i) statutory law—especially federal law—is public 
 
 33.  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“[t]here is no federal general common law.”). 
 34.  Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 494–95 (1953) 
(Jackson, J.) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the Court’s observations in this quote appear 
analytically unsophisticated and conclusory in nature. Yet, they likely reflect the dominant understanding 
of the time, given the confidence with which the pronouncement was made. 
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law, and (ii) public (interest and) policy is paramount in the construction and 
understanding of these statutes. Principles take a veritable backseat. 
II.  PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The idea of statutory law as public law regardless of its substantive 
content is today well ensconced in American legal thinking. While public 
law thinking is principally responsible for this reality, American private law 
scholars share a good deal of responsibility for it as well. In limiting their 
focus principally to private law doctrine produced through the common law 
method, private law scholars have done surprisingly little to challenge the 
dominance of the public law view of statutes. This despite the abundance of 
what are best described as “private law statutes:” legislative enactments on 
private law subjects (i.e., those dealing with the horizontal interaction 
between parties) that seek to influence and mold the relationship between 
parties using principles specific to their horizontal interaction rather than 
entirely through collectivist ideals. 
Ironically, private law statutes are today far more common in non-U.S. 
common law jurisdictions including the U.K., the birthplace of the common 
law. And while courts and scholars in these jurisdictions do not refer to such 
statutes by that name, they nonetheless understand, interpret, and apply them 
in a way that is faithful to their substantive (i.e., private law) content without 
defaulting into an overly deferential search for a collectivist legislative 
policy. The remainder of this Part explores the divergence between U.S. and 
non-U.S. thinking (i.e., statutory interpretation) on the issue, even within the 
common law world. It does so by examining how courts approach the 
interpretation of a U.K. statute that is self-consciously within an area 
traditionally defined as private law (contract law); and then looking to 
another area (copyright law) that has in the U.S. come to be understood as 
public law, in contrast to the U.K. where it is implicitly treated as a private 
law subject and comparing the interpretive approaches of U.S. and U.K. 
courts therein. 
An important caveat about line drawing is in order before proceeding 
further. The term “private law statute” refers not just to statutes that are 
entirely private law focused but also to provisions within otherwise 
sprawling statutes where this private law orientation manifests itself. A more 
precise term for these provisions might be “private law provisions,” yet to 
avoid a multiplicity of terms the former is used to cover the latter as well. 
Situations involving private law provisions within broader statutes present 
their own set of line drawing and classificatory complexities, which this 
paper does not address. In particular, the issue of how to deal with statutes 
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that are principally regulatory and policy-driven in their orientation, but then 
deploy private law thinking to realize their policy goals, presents its own set 
of questions about the desirability of this public law/private law synthesis 
and the effect of this interaction on the normative values that each body of 
thought brings to the statute. 
A.  THE [U.K.] CONTRACT (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT OF 1999 
A bedrock principle in the common law of contracts has long been the 
doctrine of privity. 35  The doctrine was understood as precluding third 
parties—who were not party to the actual contract—from being able to 
enforce the contract, even if they had been expressly identified as such.36 
The logic for this prohibition was tied to the rule that non-parties obtained 
neither benefits nor burdens from a contract that could be legally enforced.37 
In due course it also came to be tied up with the idea of contractual 
consideration, such that some courts justified the prohibition on the basis that 
the third party had given no consideration to the original contracting parties 
to justify the conferral of enforceable rights on it.38 
Over the years, the principle was seen as unduly restrictive and of little 
practical utility, especially in situations where all the parties involved had 
actively wanted a third party to take some benefit from the contract. This was 
especially true in cases involving maritime contracts, where parties 
consciously try to extend contractual benefits to third parties involved in the 
transportation chain. English common law courts thus began to craft tailored 
exceptions to the general rule and in their decisions openly noted the 
impracticality of the prohibition, when applied as a bright line rule.39 
 
 35.  For an overview of privity, see Robert Merkin, Historical Introduction to the Law of Privity, 
in PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 1–18 (Robert Merkin ed., 2000). The fundamental nature of the doctrine was 
famously echoed by Viscount Haldane in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge Ltd. [1915] AC 847 
(HL) 853 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
 36.  This rule was known as the “third party rule.” See Stephen A. Smith, Contracts for the Benefit 
of Third Parties: In Defense of the Third Party Rule, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 643, 644 (1997). 
 37.  For a defense of the rule, see id. at 645–49. 
 38.  Id. at 644 (separating the “third party rule” and the “consideration rule”); Merkin, supra note 
35, at 10–12. 
 39.  See, e.g., Pyrene Co. v. Scindia Navigation Co. [1954] 2 QB 402 at 425–26 (Eng.) (“finding 
it would have made no sense to hold that a shipowner was not liable for goods not loaded when he was 
not a party in a contract between a buyer and seller of those goods”); New Zealand Shipping Co. v. 
Sattherwaite Ltd. [1975] AC 154 (PC) (“holding that a shipping company was able to gain the benefit of 
exemption from liability for damage to goods shipped even though it was not explicitly a party to the 
contract between a manufacturer and purchaser and even though the contract did not specify consideration 
on the shipping company’s part in exchange for such liability exemption because the consideration was 
implied to be the performance of shipping services”); K.H. Enterprise v. Pioneer Container [1994] 2 All 
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After years of deliberation, Parliament enacted the Contract (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act in 1999, based on the Law Revision Commission’s study 
of the topic and its recommendations for reform through legislation.40 The 
principal aim of the law was to relax the rigidity of the privity rule for third 
party beneficiaries. A short statute (of ten sections), its principal provision is 
Section 1(1), which allows a third party to enforce a term of a contract “in 
his own right” if the contract either expressly allows for such enforcement 
or purports to confer a benefit on him.41 
A few things are noteworthy about the statute and its passage. Despite 
having clear commercial effects on different sectors of the economy, in its 
actual framing the entire statute is sector neutral and couched in the abstract 
language of contract law doctrine. Further, this is so despite the Commission 
study on which it was based, which conducted an elaborate survey of the 
need for the law from the perspective of various market sectors.42 
Despite dealing with contract law, an area traditionally classified as 
private law, the statute could have been understood and interpreted in either 
public law or private law terms. Under the public law rubric (characteristic 
of Legal Process thinking), it could have been understood as a piece of 
economic legislation directed at facilitating contractual arrangements 
commonly seen in certain sectors—such as the shipping and transportation 
industries—and therefore reflecting a grand bargain of sorts that balances the 
multiple interests at issue. Then, when an interpretive question arises a court 
would treat the bargain as the starting point for its identification of a policy 
and arrive at an interpretation aligned with that policy and purpose. The 
Court of Appeals’ second opinion in the Gillarde case is a prime example of 
how this might have happened, perhaps even inviting the intervention of 
federal agencies dealing with contractual arrangements, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). 
By contrast, in the private law approach, the statute would be 
 
ER 250 (PC), 1–17 (appeal taken from H.K.) (“finding by reference to bailment law that an owner of 
goods could sue a sub-contracted shipping company for lost goods even though the owner did not have 
privity of contract with the shipping company, but also finding that the owner was held to an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in the sub-contract because the owner’s contract with the initial shipping company 
stipulated that its goods may be shipped by a sub-contractor “on any terms” and the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision was not unreasonable”); The Mahkutai [1996] 3 All ER 502 (PC), 1–4, 13–17 (appeal taken 
from H.K.) (“finding that the owner of goods could sue a sub-contractor despite a lack of privity, but that 
an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the original contract between the owner and shipping contractor was 
not binding on the owner in its suit against the sub-contractor”). 
 40.  Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999, c. 31 (Eng.).  
 41.  Id. at § 1(1). 
 42. LAW COMMISSION NO. 424: PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD 
PARTIES §§ 4.1–4.35 (1996). 
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understood as itself driven by the contract law principle of prioritizing 
contractual intent over all else absent concerns of morality or public policy. 
The legislation would thus be seen as simply allowing contractual intent to 
override concerns about privity and consideration, when abundantly clear—
a simple rearrangement of horizontal contract law principles. The 
interpretive approach accompanying this understanding would eschew any 
reference to an external/market purpose or policy underlying the statute and 
defer to contract law principles rather than a legislative policy, if any. 
Indeed, scholarly analyses and interpretation of the statute have almost 
uniformly treated the statute as a private law enactment and attempted to 
analyze it using the rubric of contract law principles.43 Even those critical of 
the Act appear to concede that it is best understood as a principle-driven 
legislation, and that attempting to understand it in terms of overarching 
commercial policy is futile.44 One private law scholar takes issue with the 
statute’s deviation from the traditional rationales and principles for private 
law liability in the common law, arguing that the mere reliance on 
contractual intent is insufficient as an independent (principled) basis for civil 
liability.45 Notably though, this scholar stops well short of identifying the 
statute in anything but private law terms; to the contrary, his own criticism 
is premised on the statute being a private law statute.46 
In the years since the enactment of the statute, the few courts 
interpreting it have almost uniformly understood it in private law terms. The 
earliest cases interpreting the principal provisions of the statute treated it as 
applying a purely objective test of contractual intention, an established 
principle that the statute was seen as incorporating.47 In one notable case, a 
plaintiff relied on the statute to claim that it was an identified beneficiary in 
 
 43.  See, e.g., Neil Andrews, Strangers to Justice No Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rules 
Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 357–78 (2001) 
(examining inter alia the Act’s treatment of determining third party rights, available remedies to third 
parties, contracting parties’ power to rescind, defenses against third party claims, and the scope of third 
party rights); Catharine Macmillan, A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999, 63 MOD. L. REV. 721, 723–738 (2000) (discussing inter alia the contracting parties’ 
ability to “gift” or limit third party rights, potential difficulties for third parties to enforce their rights, and 
the relaxation of consideration); Robert Stevens, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 120 L. 
QUART. REV. 292 (2004). 
 44.  Stevens, supra note 43, at 323 (noting how “the Act has left English law in an incoherent 
state.”). 
 45.  Kincaid, supra note __, at 46-47. 
 46.  Id. at 47. He nevertheless does suggest that the Act appears to be more concerned with 
collectivist considerations than private law ones. 
 47.  Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC (Comm.)  2602 (Eng.); Laemthong 
Int’l Lines Co. v. Artis [2005] EWHC (Comm.) 1595 (Eng.). 
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a transfer agreement between two corporations.48 The agreement had the 
transferee assume any liabilities of the transferor, and made the transferee 
agree to complete any outstanding customer orders. The plaintiff sought to 
argue that this satisfied the statute’s requirement that the beneficiary be 
“expressly identified.”49 The court disagreed, and in so doing rejected a 
plausible argument grounded in consumer protection policy, though noting 
that the “temptation” to accept such logic was “great”.50 Instead, the court 
relied on the logic that the statute was clear about the distinction between an 
identified and an unidentified class, and sought to limit its relaxation of the 
privity doctrine to the former; again, in keeping with the idea that contractual 
intention was the principle at the root of the legislation. 
The U.K. Act thus illustrates the working of a statute that was self-
consciously designed as a private law statute and interpreted and understood 
by courts and scholars as such. In dealing with the statute, courts’ and 
scholars’ interpretive focus has been on the basis and logic for the private 
cause of action brought by the third party, and for which they have made 
primary resort to contract law principles, eschewingcat times consciously—
reference to collectivist goals and ideals. 
B.  U.K. AND U.S. COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 
Given that the Act of 1999 was in an area traditionally thought of as 
private law to begin with, it may seem altogether unsurprising that courts 
(and scholars) interpret it using private law ideas and principles. 
Additionally, drawing a comparison to U.S. courts’ approach on similar 
issues poses obvious difficulties since general contract law remains an area 
beyond the purview of federal legislation except under rare circumstances 
relating to national concerns (e.g., PACA). Highlighting the divergence in 
interpretive approaches between U.S. and U.K. courts more fully 
necessitates looking to an area that (a) presents comparable statutes in both 
jurisdictions, and (b) is amenable to both public law and private law 
interpretations such that the adoption of one over the other is a matter of 
choice. Copyright law fits both criteria rather well and evinces this 
divergence between the two jurisdictions. 
The most recent copyright statutes in both countries were enacted 
within a decade of each other, the U.S. Act in 1976, 51  while its U.K. 
 
 48.  Avraamides v. Colwill [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1533 (Eng.). 
 49.  Act of 1999, § 1(3). 
 50.  Avraamides [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1533, at ¶ 18. 
 51.  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541.  
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counterpart in 1988. 52  Both are elaborate pieces of comprehensive 
legislation that build on prior statutes and case law. Covering the entirety of 
copyright law in order to compare how courts have approached interpreting 
the statute in the two countries is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Consequently, the discussion that follows focuses on two important domains 
(both covered by the respective statutes) where this divergence is most 
apparent: joint authorship and originality. 
1.  Joint Authorship 
The phenomenon of multiple authorship is ancient; and yet copyright 
law around the world has struggled to develop a coherent framework to 
analyze the practice and accord it appropriate importance. All the same, it 
remains an excellent example to compare public and private law thinking in 
so far as it combines elements from contract law, tort law, and property law 
within the overall skein of copyright’s other normative ideals. 
The U.S. copyright statute approaches joint authorship through the 
nature of the work produced through the process, which it defines as “a work 
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions 
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”53 
The U.K. statute—the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988—does 
something very similar and defines a work of joint authorship as “a work 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the 
contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or 
authors.”54 
A notable distinction between the two provisions is that the former 
expressly incorporates a reference to “intention” while the latter does not. 
Unsurprisingly, this has caused courts to interpret the provisions differently. 
All the same, one interpretation adopted an overt policy-driven public law 
approach, while the other treated copyright like the private law institution 
that it always was as a historical matter. 
In the U.S. context, it wasn’t until the year 1991 that the provision 
invited serious judicial scrutiny. In a case brought by the producer of a play 
against its principal author wherein the former claimed to be a joint author 
of the play, Childress v. Taylor55, the Second Circuit was called to interpret 
 
 52.  U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48. 
 53.  17 U.S.C. §101 (definition of “joint work”).  
 54.  CDPA 1988, § 10(1) (defining a “work of joint authorship”). 
 55.  945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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the statute’s requirements for joint authorship. In so doing, the court 
concluded that most of the statutory definition of the idea was 
“straightforward” except for its emphasis on intention,56 for which it looked 
to the legislative history accompanying the enactment of the 1976 Act, which 
noted that “the touchstone here [i.e., in the definition] is the intention, at the 
time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an 
integrated unit.”57 Using this language, the court then concluded that the 
requirement of intention was so overarching that a collaboration as such was 
insufficient to generate joint authorship unless the requisite intention could 
be independently proven.58 
The court’s rationale for this interpretation was to avoid joint authorship 
being extended to “many persons who are not likely to have been within the 
contemplation of Congress” because it would allow an individual making a 
minimal contribution to the work to unfairly claim an “undivided half 
interest” in the work.59 This last set of considerations had little to do with the 
nature and form of the collaboration at issue, the process through which the 
work was created, or indeed the text of the statutory provision; it was instead 
motivated by an important policy consideration: avoiding contributors from 
overreaching in their claims, which would itself deter additional 
collaboration and joint authorship. Signaling the need for a higher 
threshold—in the nature of proof of intention—was thus meant to send a 
signal for the future. 
The court’s interpretation was thus driven by its identification of a 
policy-rationale, and was overtly collectivist in orientation in that it was 
more about Congress’ presumptive concerns with contributor overreach. 
Missing altogether in the opinion, even if intention were taken as central to 
the provision, was any reference to what such intention was meant to serve 
and its role as a mechanism of evidencing a common design, a consensus ad 
idem, an idea well developed in contract law. 
The Childress opinion is to be contrasted with how courts in the U.K. 
have interpreted the definition of a joint work under the 1988 Act. In a 2003 
case, Hodgens v. Beckingham,60 the Court of Appeals was asked to consider 
introducing the idea of intention into the definition, as an implicit 
requirement underlying the idea of a collaboration. Specifically, the court 
 
 56.  Id. at 505. 
 57.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 201, at 120 (1976). 
 58.  Childress, 945 F.2d at 505–06. 
 59.  Id. at 507. 
 60.  [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143 (Eng.). 
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was asked to follow the example of Childress.61 It balked at the idea, noting 
that the logic of Childress was entirely policy-driven, and premised on the 
belief that Congress would have wanted to limit joint authorship. U.K. 
courts, the Court of Appeals concluded, were to limit themselves to the 
statute and principles implicit within it, rather than delving “into the 
uncertain realms of policy.”62 
Rejecting a policy-driven approach, as the U.K. courts have, is a far cry 
from suggesting that they instead do no more than apply the plain text of the 
provision. To the contrary, U.K. case law has embellished the statutory 
definition as well, but in doing so has looked entirely to principles internal 
to the idea of joint authorship and collaborative design. The High Court 
decision of Martin v. Kogan63 offers a useful contrast in so far as it addressed 
the same question as Childress, namely whether there needed to be a 
sufficiency threshold for a contribution to qualify for joint authorship. In 
answering that in the affirmative, the court chose to look at the idea of 
authorship and derive from it the principle that each type of work (literary, 
artistic, etc.) had a “primary skill” associated with its creation, and that for a 
joint work each author had to contribute a substantial amount of primary 
skill. 64  While “secondary skills” did not imply the absence of joint 
authorship, they nevertheless made its occurrence difficult owing to 
evidentiary reasons relating to copyright’s protectability doctrines.65  The 
court in Martin also emphasized that joint authorship was related to the idea 
of co-ownership, but that as with co-ownership there could well be disparate 
shares of ownership involved, which required an apportionment.66 
Relying thus on principles drawn from (i) the nature of authorship (i.e., 
skills involved), (ii) the connection between authorship and ownership (i.e., 
apportionment), and (iii) the centrality of copyright’s protectability rules 
(i.e., secondary skills and substantiality), the court arrived at nearly the same 
place as Childress. Yet, its logic was principle-oriented, driven by the 
interior design of authorship and ownership, and eschewed any reference to 
a collective legislative design that it was merely seeking to give effect to for 
the collective good. 
 
 61.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
 62.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
 63.  [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927 (Eng.). 
 64.  Id. at ¶ 44–49. 
 65.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
 66.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
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2.  Originality 
The doctrine of originality is copyright’s most important protectability 
requirement. While originally a creation of courts in both countries (i.e., the 
U.S. and U.K.), the doctrine was later incorporated into their respective 
copyright statutes—with the understanding that courts could continue to 
develop it incrementally and contextually as they had before. As a formal 
matter, originality today therefore derives from the statute but affords courts 
significant interpretive leeway—akin to common law statutes. 67  This 
dimension injects an additional point of interest into the comparison. 
The U.S. Act of 1976 accords copyright protection to all “original 
works of authorship.” 68  The absence of a definition in the statute was 
intended to allow for the incorporation of the extant judicial understanding 
of the term.69 The originality doctrine had evolved in different ways over the 
lifetime of American copyright law,70 but under the 1976 Act it received its 
most elaborate treatment and interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
case of Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 71  Feist showcases the 
dominance of the public law approach to statutory interpretation and 
construction and a rather complete disregard of private law ideals during that 
process. 
Feist involved the question of whether a telephone directory was 
copyrightable when it was nothing more than a compilation of facts. In a 
pathbreaking move, the Court departed from the doctrine as it had been 
understood previously and added a requirement of “minimal creativity” to it, 
noting that “originality. . . means only that the work was independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”72 The Court’s logic 
for this interpretation, which it drew from past precedent, was the text of the 
Constitution.73 Reading the Constitution’s mandate that copyright “promote 
 
 67.  Common law statutes are those that delegate law-making to courts. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983). 
 68.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2015). 
 69.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 57, at 51. 
 70.  For a wonderful historical account of this evolution, see Oren Bracha, The Ideology of 
Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE 
L.J., 186 200–24. (2008).  
 71.  Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  For commentary on the case, 
see Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist 
v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (a commentary on the Feist case); Jessica Litman, 
After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607 (1992); Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in 
Copyright Law, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992). 
 72.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 73.  Id. at 346 (“[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.”). 
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the Court concluded that an 
originality requirement that focused on a minimal level of creativity and 
eschewed a bare reliance on creative labor was essential.74  The Court’s 
construction was therefore “the means by which copyright advances the 
progress of science and art.”75 
Feist’s invocation of the Constitution to interpret originality in a 
manner that denies protection to pure works of information has been 
understood as “implement[ing] a policy favoring general, free access to 
disclosed data,” and seen as driven by an impulse to reorient law-making 
power between Congress and the courts.76 Leaving aside the merits of the 
actual originality standard set out in the opinion, Feist’s decision to look to 
the primary source of public policy (i.e., the Constitution) for guidance, 
rather than to copyright’s internal principles is quite telling. In 
constitutionalizing an established copyright law doctrine, it effectively 
confirmed the primacy of copyright policy (as defined in the constitution) 
over any of the doctrine’s underlying principles: a rather direct and bold 
instantiation of the Legal Process approach. 
Just what might those principles have been instead? For that, we merely 
have to look to how U.K. courts have approached the question. Since the 
early twentieth century, English courts have consistently held that originality 
in copyright law was primarily a question of individual skill and effort in the 
production of expression.77 As long as an author applied skill and labor in 
the creation of a work, such that it might be said to have originated with that 
author, the standard was satisfied.78 This approach might be understood to 
embody the principle of “skill and effort origination” emanating from 
copyright’s fundamental idea of authorship, predicated on the connection 
between creator and work. 79  The approach consciously abandons any 
assessment of the merits of the work, which the Feist court implicitly 
adopted in its emphasis on the work showing a minimal amount of creativity. 
 
 74.  Id. at 349–50. 
 75.  Id. at 350. 
 76.  Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 339. 
 77.  See, e.g., Univ. of London Press v. Univ. Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, at 609–10 (Eng.); 
Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539 (Eng.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 
All ER 465. 
 78.  Cf. Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” 
Doctrine Under Pressure, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION. L. 4, 13 (2013) (reading an 
element of Locke’s labor theory of ownership into this understanding of originality, which seems a little 
far-fetched.). 
 79.  For more on this connection and its normative dimensions, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–34 (2017). 
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U.K. courts have had little problem applying this interpretation of 
originality to the Act of 1988. They have extended it to databases as well, 
emphasizing that the test involves assessing the “process of creation and the 
identification of the skill and labour that has gone into it.”80 Once significant 
effort, skill, and time are seen to have been applied in the process of creating 
a work, the requirement is seen as satisfied since the individual has 
effectively become the author of the work. Under the influence of EU law, 
courts have insisted that the standard requires that the work bear the imprint 
of the author’s “own intellectual creation,” which does not modify the prior 
standard significantly. 81  If anything, it reiterates the “skill and effort 
origination” principle that the U.K. originality doctrine has been crafted on. 
In practice and application, little may turn on the difference between the 
two countries. Yet, it represents a fundamental divergence in the 
interpretation and understanding of the doctrine. In theory, a work (e.g., such 
as the telephone directory in Feist) could be denied copyright protection in 
the U.S. for being insufficiently creative in its result, while it would obtain 
protection in the U.K. for reflecting the own skill and labor of its compiler 
in its process of creation. And the former outcome would have been driven 
by the policy of using copyright to promote the progress of the sciences and 
useful arts, while the latter would remain rooted in the principles of 
authorship, skill, and effort origination that it embodied. Leaving aside 
which one is preferable, the methodological divergence in approach is 
obvious. 
* * * 
The copyright statute is thus for the most part treated as a private law 
statute in the U.K. (and indeed in most other common law countries), where 
the rights of the individual creator and his/her interactions with others forms 
the focal point of the analysis, and from which doctrines are interpreted and 
expounded on in a principled manner. Courts do of course occasionally look 
to the broader socio-economic objectives of the law—its policy—in their 
analysis, but rarely ever do they either start with this policy in their 
interpretation of the law, or let the policy override existing principles. In the 
U.S., the opposite is true. The law’s overarching goals—often drawn from 
congressional reports accompanying the legislation, economic theory, or the 
text of the Constitution—operate as starting points for the analysis and often 
function as complete substitutes for principles. While it would be a far cry to 
 
 80.  The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding B.V. [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099, 
at ¶ 71. 
 81.  Rahmatian, supra note 78, at 25–29. 
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suggest that this has had the effect of converting U.S. copyright law into an 
area of public law, it is certainly the case that interpretations of the U.S. 
copyright statute readily partake of the legal process phenomenon of public 
law statutory interpretation, which has an overtly collectivist orientation 
rather than one that is individualist and focused on the author’s rights and 
allied obligations. 
III.  PRIVATE LAW VALUES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Obviously, the methods of private law statutory interpretation merit 
application to statutes when the interpreter determines that the statute 
incorporates ideals and values from private law thinking. This is most likely 
to be the case when (i) the statute creates a private cause of action for a new 
wrong, or (ii) is parasitic on an area of the law traditionally understood as 
private law in orientation. 
It bears emphasizing that a statute need not abjure all collectivist ideals 
for courts to see it as incorporating private law elements. This is especially 
true of statutes that fall under the first category above, involving the creation 
of a new wrong and corresponding private cause of action. Anti-
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, are good examples here. Deriving 
from the constitutional goal of equality, the statute works by creating a 
private wrong and rendering it actionable by the individual harmed. The 
collectivist ideal at its heart interacts with the private harm and wrong that it 
identifies to produce a confluence of normative ideals, and interpretations of 
the statute would do well to avoid ignoring the private law ideals that it 
incorporates.82 
This then brings us to the obvious task of identifying these “private law 
values” that interpretations of private law statutes and provisions should pay 
attention to. The remainder of this Part provides a brief overview of three 
such values; and while more may indeed exist these three remain central to 
the functioning of private law statutes and are worthy of recognition in the 
interpretive process. 
1.  Redressive Autonomy 
A hallmark of numerous statutes is their allowance for a private cause 
of action, when a breach of a statutory obligation or directive results in harm. 
 
 82.  For an important account making this move and emphasizing the role of private law and 
considerations of individualism in discrimination law, see generally Sophia Moreau, What is 
Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 143 (2010). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369233 
PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION_BALGANESH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:58 PM 
2019] PRIVATE LAW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 121 
Civil rights legislation, 83  antitrust law, 84  qui tam statutes, 85  intellectual 
property statutes, 86  environmental legislation, 87  just to name a few all 
embody important private actions that afford parties a mechanism of civil 
redress against wrongdoers. As a general matter, these provisions have been 
understood almost entirely in public law terms, as embodying what scholars 
have long described as a mechanism for a “private attorney general” which 
is generally defined as “a plaintiff who sues to vindicate public interests not 
directly connected to any special stake of her own.” 88  This definition 
captures the collectivist stance in the understanding of private enforcement 
provisions, which are thus seen as doing nothing more than allowing an 
individual to stand-in for the state and enforce collectivist ideals and 
concerns. In this understanding the state is seen as using private individuals 
as a mere means towards it collective end, and that use (so to speak) adds no 
normative content of its own. 
As should be apparent, this approach denies altogether the autonomy of 
the private individual in the overall skein of the statute. By assuming that the 
right set of monetary incentives will motivate actors to bring actions 
whenever there is a sufficient recovery at stake, it undervalues the complex 
set of motivations that ordinarily accompany a private lawsuit and the claims 
made therein.89 In other words, it fails to recognize that there could well be 
reasons—deriving from the horizontal relationship that a private action 
entails—for an individual to bring or forego a private action even when there 
is a clear basis for recovery. Sometimes the norms of human interaction 
involve tolerating otherwise clear breaches of the law, for relational 
reasons.90 And in so doing, the toleration produces its own set of norms that 
make their way into conventional morality.91 
A private law approach to such private enforcement provisions would 
 
 83.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 84.  15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
 85.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
 86.  17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §271 (2012). 
 87.  42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012). 
 88.  See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 589, 590 (2005). 
 89.  Much of this thinking relies on the idea of a rational actor motivated entirely by individual 
self-interest, measured in terms of costs and benefits. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: 
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3, 23–24 (2010). 
 90.  This is the premise of an idea in copyright law that identifies a set of exceptions produced 
entirely by creators tolerating acts of infringement by choosing not to enforce them, for a variety of 
different reasons. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 752 (2013). 
 91.  Balganesh, supra note 90, at 760. 
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instead recognize the intrinsic autonomy of the private actor involved, a form 
of autonomy best described as “redressive autonomy.” Recognizing this 
autonomy would in turn allow the analysis to move away from the banal 
treatment of such actions as driven entirely by public interest considerations. 
It would instead acknowledge the complex relational dimensions involved 
in the action and the set of norms and values at stake in such actions, which 
may not be to the exclusion of the public interest but can at times certainly 
influence or modulate it. 
2.  Individuation of Directives 
Individuation refers to the idea that private law, at its core, operates by 
creating individual private rights and obligations. They are private in the 
sense that they have a normative existence that is analytically independent 
of the state, and operate relationally between parties at the horizontal level. 
Private law statutes thus work by creating rights and duties between parties. 
Yet, after such formal creation, these rights and duties operate between the 
parties on their own quite independently of the state—through market and 
non-market interactions and other forms of interpersonal relationships. An 
exclusive focus on statutes as nothing more than embodiments of collective 
ideals ignores the centrality of such individuation that statutes can indeed 
produce. 
Individuation can emanate from a statute, when it is the starting point 
for an area of law such as it is with copyright. Here, the statute sets up a 
framework of author’s rights and copier’s obligations; yet thereafter authors, 
copiers, and other actors interact and deal with each other on a regular basis 
without the direct involvement of the statute or the state.92 To be sure, this 
doesn’t mean that the possibility of state action doesn’t loom large over such 
interactions, just that the interactions assume a life of their own at the 
individual—rather than collective—level, which is of the missed in the 
public law approach to interpretation. At other times, a statute may be 
parasitic on a pre-existing set of interpersonal interactions. Legislation in the 
domain of contract law is a good example.93 Here, readings of the statute 
again need to be sensitive to the individuated sub-structure that they are 
premised on and the manner in which that individual interaction is likely to 
 
 92.  Undoubtedly, they do so in the shadow of the law. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 93.  Such as it was the with the Uniform Commercial Code, which built on existing contract law 
rules and self-consciously enabled courts to continue to develop common law rules in its domains. For a 
fuller account, see Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401 
(1968). 
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be affected and impacted by its terms. 
To be clear, recognizing the importance of individuation private law 
statutes does not require jettisoning collective ideals and goals in the 
interpretive process. Instead, it recognizes a separate set of messages that the 
provision communicates to actors shaping their lives and interactions around 
the statute’s rights and responsibilities that operate at the level of the 
individual. 
3.  Principled Horizontal Coherence 
A third value of importance involves the repudiation of an idea that was 
central to Henry Hart’s thinking about statutes—namely, that they could 
operate as “arbitrary starting points” for the interpretation.94 In other words, 
the public law approach assumes that the statutes can identify their own 
purposes and values (policy), which need to be taken at face value given the 
supremacy of the legislative as law-making body. Private law statutory 
interpretation would question this and instead operate on the assumption that 
the legal directives at issue operate to govern a set of horizontal relationships 
or interactions, and that they are to be understood and interpreted using 
principles and values that derive from that horizontality. 
A hypothetical example might illustrate this idea. Assume that 
tomorrow Congress decides to amend the U.S. copyright statute to introduce 
a provision that defines originality by merely saying, ”a work is original if it 
is created by the author.” On its face now, in plain terms originality requires 
creation. A court—such as Feist—reading it in public law terms and looking 
to the Constitution could interpret the idea of “created” to require an 
examination of some minimal creativity on the face of the work for it to 
obtain protection. A private law approach that takes the horizontal coherence 
of copyright’s authorship ideal seriously would instead seek to render the 
definition compatible with the law’s understanding of authorship and its 
principles for identifying who an author is in different contexts. This 
interpretation would merely see the originality standard as a continuation of 
the system’s emphasis on author’s rights. 
The idea of principled horizontal coherence builds on Dworkin’s idea 
of “law as integrity” but in a limited manner.95 It seeks integrity in the set of 
ideas and principles underlying the particular private law area at issue and 
not beyond, but takes seriously the idea that such interpretation must operate 
as a chain novel, rather than allowing for each provision to become an 
 
 94.  HART & SACKS, supra note 10, at lxxx. 
 95.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 226 (1986). 
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arbitrary and independent starting point each time.96 
CONCLUSION 
Statutory law is today ubiquitous and an undeniable reality of the 
modern state. Private law theory and thinking would do well to pay greater 
attention to statutory law. This is especially true in the U.S., where statutory 
interpretation has come to be co-opted by public law thinking, such that the 
idea of private law statutes remains something of a novelty. As I have shown 
this is less true in other common law countries, especially the U.K. where 
the common law has come to be codified and/or supplemented by legislation. 
The effect of this neglect in the U.S. is that statutory subjects that deserve to 
be understood—even if only partially—through private law ideas never 
really obtain such treatment. 
Solving this problem in American legal thinking is obviously more 
complex than it might seem. Among other things, it involves uprooting 
decades of skepticism about the distinctiveness of private law, while 
challenging the general dominance of public law thinking in all areas of 
American legal scholarship. While that remains a tall order, an important 
first step remains having courts and scholars acknowledge the existence of 
independent private law values that are worthy of incorporation into the 
exercise of statutory interpretation. And for this, they would do well to 
acknowledge the divergence between U.S. and non-U.S. legal thinking on 
this matter and recognize the shortcomings of American exceptionalism in 
this area. 
 
 
 96.  The “chain novel” metaphor was used by Dworkin in his description of law as integrity. Id. at 
229–32. 
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